On the Performance of Secure Full-Duplex Relaying under Composite Fading
  Channels by Alves, Hirley et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
41
1.
38
56
v2
  [
cs
.IT
]  
21
 N
ov
 20
14
1
On the Performance of Secure Full-Duplex
Relaying under Composite Fading Channels
Hirley Alves, Glauber Brante, Richard D. Souza, Daniel B. da Costa, and Matti Latva-aho,
Abstract—We assume a full-duplex (FD) cooperative network
subject to hostile attacks and undergoing composite fading
channels. We focus on two scenarios: a) the transmitter has full
CSI, for which we derive closed-form expressions for the average
secrecy rate; and b) the transmitter only knows the CSI of the
legitimate nodes, for which we obtain closed-form expressions for
the secrecy outage probability. We show that secure FD relaying is
feasible, even under strong self-interference and in the presence
of sophisticated multiple antenna eavesdropper.
Index Terms—Full-duplex relaying, PHY security, secrecy
ergodic capacity, secrecy outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Owing to the broadcast nature of the wireless medium,
communication systems are vulnerable to the attack of eaves-
droppers and security issues play an important role in system
design. Recently, cooperative communications has appeared as
an alternative to enhance physical layer (PHY) security [1]–
[3], where a trusted relay node helps the communication be-
tween Alice and Bob through cooperation or by jamming Eve.
Most works focus on half-duplex (HD) schemes. However,
full-duplex (FD) communications have gained considerable
attention and several promising signal processing techniques
for self-interference – a power leakage between transmit and
receive signals – mitigation have been proposed [4]. Even
though ideal FD operation is not yet attainable, practical FD
communication is feasible via such self-interference mitiga-
tion. This process results in residual self-interference that can
be modeled as a fading channel, which allows the emulation
of various (non) line-of-sight configurations [4], [5].
In this work, we assume a FD cooperative network in the
presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper – named Eve. Alice
communicates with Bob – which are the legitimate nodes
– with the help of a trusted FD relay, which suffers self-
interference. We also employ a general channel model which
encompasses Nakagami-m fading as well as Log-Normal
shadowing, which is known as composite fading channel [6].
We consider two scenarios according to the availability of
channel state information (CSI) at Alice: a) Alice has the
CSI of all users, thus perfect secrecy can be achieved [7]
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and we focus on the average secrecy rate as the performance
metric, for which we present an accurate approximation in
closed-form; and b) Eve is a passive eavesdropper and Alice
has only CSI of the legitimate channels. Thus, perfect secrecy
cannot be guaranteed at all times [7], and we provide accurate
approximated closed-form expressions for the secrecy outage
probability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, such analy-
sis is still not available in the literature1. Additionally, besides
the developed mathematical framework, we show that secure
FD relaying is feasible in both scenarios under consideration,
even under the effect of self-interference.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cooperative network with three legitimate
single-antenna users: Alice (A), relay (R) and Bob (B), com-
municating in the presence of Eve (E), which has NE antennas
and employs maximal ratio combining (MRC). Moreover, we
consider that the relay operates in FD mode (with one antenna
dedicated to transmission and another to reception, in order to
increase the isolation of the self-interference [4]) and operates
under the decode-and-forward (DF) protocol.
The channels are affected by path-loss, shadowing and fad-
ing which are assumed to be independent [6]. Then, in order to
account for these channel impairments we adopt a composite
fading distribution, where fading follows Nakagami-m distri-
bution and shadowing is modeled as Log-Normal (LN) random
variable (RV), whose squared-envelop follows a Gamma-LN
distribution [6]. Moreover, as proposed in [8], the composite
squared envelop – which represents the SNR of a given link
between nodes i and j – is well approximated by a single
LN RV, whose parameters depend on the actual distribution
and are defined as: shape µdB “ ξ rψ pmq ´ ln pmqs ` µΩp
and log-scale σ2
dB
“ ξ2ζ p2,mq ` σ2
Ωp
, where m is the shape
parameter of the Nakagami-m distribution, ξ “ ln p10q {10,
Ωp is the mean squared-envelop, µΩp and σΩp is the mean
and standard deviation of Ωp, respectively.
A. Sum of LN RVs
As the density of Z “ řk γijk – a RV representing the
sum of k independent LN RVs – has no exact closed form
expression and its distribution is heavy-tailed and positively
skewed, we resort to an approximation of the sum of LN RVs
by a single LN RV [9] as follows.
1In this work we assume a multi-antenna Eve, composite fading channels
for two distinct scenarios, whereas [3] only presents a preliminary inves-
tigation on the secrecy outage probability of single antenna devices under
Rayleigh fading channels.
2Definition 1 (Cumulants and additivity property): Let X
and Y be two independent RVs. The cumulants of a RV
can be written as a function of the raw moments [10]. For
instance, the first and second cumulants of X are given as
κ1,X “ E rXs and κ2,X “ E
“
X2
‰ ´ E rXs2 [10]. Then, the
additivity property of the cumulants gives that the cumulants
of X ` Y are the sum of the individual cumulants, therefore
κn,X`Y fi κn,X ` κn,Y , where κn,X and κn,Y are the n-th
cumulants of X and Y , respectively [10].
From Definition 1 and by approximating the sum of LN RVs
by a single LN RV [9], we estimate the parameters of the sin-
gle LN RV from the cumulants as µ “ ln `κ21˘´lnpaκ21 ` κ2q
and σ2 “ ln `κ21 ` κ2˘´ lnpκ21q, where µ is the mean and σ2
is the variance of the equivalent Normalpµ, σ2q distribution in
logarithmic scale [10], [11, Ch. 26].
B. Legitimate Channel
The DF protocol can be decomposed into two phases:
broadcast (BC) and multiple access (MAC). Differently from
HD relaying, the MAC phase starts simultaneously with the
BC phase under the FD mode, so that the relay forwards to
Bob the message received from Alice in a previous phase at
the same time that Alice broadcasts a new message to the relay
and Bob. Thus, the received signals at the relay and Bob are
yR “
b
PAd
´ν
AR hAR ¨ x`
a
PR δ hRR ¨ x˜` wR, (1)
yB “
b
PAd
´ν
AB hAB ¨ x`
b
PR d
´ν
RB hRB ¨ x˜` wB, (2)
where hij, i P tA,Ru and j P tR,Bu, denotes channel
coefficient, Pi is the transmit power, dij is the distance between
nodes i and j, and ν is the path loss exponent. Additionally,
wj is zero-mean complex Gaussian noise with unity variance,
x is the unity energy transmitted symbol, while x˜ is the unity
energy symbol forwarded by the relay. Let us remark that use
a different codebook and x and x˜ may be not identical.
1) FD Relaying: The message is divided into L blocks, as
shown in Fig. 1. Additionally, due to the inherent characteris-
tics of the encoding/decoding scheme, x˜ is delayed compared
to x, so that x˜rls “ xrl´τ s, where 1 ď l ď L and τ represents
the processing and block delay of τ ě 1 blocks, which we
assume hereafter to be τ “ 1. As pointed out in [12] this
delay is large enough to guarantee that the received signals
are uncorrelated, and therefore can be jointly decoded. A first
analysis on such decoding schemes for practical FD relaying is
done in [13], which is later extended in [14], where the authors
generalize the backward decoding scheme for any delay and
number of blocks and show that performance is not affected for
large L. Hereafter we assume regular encoding and backward
decoding [1], [15]2.
Further, we consider all channels (hij) as quasi-static inde-
pendent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) according to com-
posite Nakagami-m Log-Normal distribution. The relay suffers
from self-interference, which we model as a composite fading
channel denoted by hRR, and δ represents the overall self-
interference attenuation factor. Additionally, since all RVs are
2Please refer to [15] for details on DF regular encoding and backward
decoding, and to [1, Th. 2] for an analysis on the relay-eavesdropper channel.
x[1] x[2] · · · x[L− 1] x[L]Alice
x˜[1] x˜[2] · · · x˜[L− 1] x˜[L]Relay
Fig. 1. Alice and relay block transmission. Notice that the frame is divided
into L blocks and the relay’s transmission is delayed by one block (τ “ 1).
i.i.d. the instantaneous SNRs of the legitimate links are LN
distributed as Γij ∼ LN pµij, σijq [8]. The SINR at the relay
is ΓR “ ΓARΓRR , which is also a LN RV defined as ΓR ∼
LNpµR , σRq, where µR “ µAR ´µRR and σR “ pσ2AR `σ2RRq
1
2
[16]. The first two cumulants of Γij can be readily attained
through Definition 1 as κ1,Γij and κ2,Γij . With that, and relying
on the additive property [16], we obtain the cumulants of the
overall SNR at Bob, ΓB “ ΓAB ` ΓRB, and then the sum of
two LN RVs can be simply written as a single LN RV as ΓB ∼
LNpµB, σBq, where µB “ ln
`
κ2
1,ΓB
˘´ 1
2
lnpκ2
1,ΓB
` κ2,ΓBq and
σ2B “ ln
`
κ2
1,ΓB
` κ2,ΓB
˘´ lnpκ2
1,ΓB
q .
C. Eavesdropper Channel
We assume that Eve is equipped with NE antennas and
applies MRC to the received signals. Thus, the NEˆ1 received
signal is
yE “
b
PAd
´ν
AE hAE ¨ x`
b
PR d
´ν
RE hRE ¨ x˜`wE, (3)
where hiE, i P tA,Ru, denotes the channel coefficients vectors
(NE ˆ 1) at the eavesdropper. Additionally, wE is zero-mean
complex Gaussian noise NE ˆ 1 vector with unity variance.
From Definition 1 we obtain the cumulants of γiEk . More-
over, once all RVs are i.i.d., we the cumulants of ΓiE “ř
k γiEk are simply NE κn,ΓiE , where i P tA, Ru and 1 ď k ď
NE. Then, since ΓAE and ΓRE are independent we resort again
to Definition 1 and define the cumulants of ΓE “ ΓAE ` ΓRE
as κn “ NEpκn,ΓAE ` κn,ΓREq, which allows us to write
ΓE ∼ LNpµE , σEq, whose parameters are µE “ ln
`
κ2
1,ΓE
˘ ´
1
2
lnpκ2
1,ΓE
` κ2,ΓEq and σ2E “ ln
`
κ2
1,ΓE
` κ2,ΓE
˘´ lnpκ2
1,ΓE
q.
III. SCENARIO 1 (SC1): AVERAGE SECRECY RATE
First, let us suppose that Eve is part of the network and Alice
is able to acquire the CSI from it. For instance, this scenario
may represent Alice wanting to communicate privately to
a certain user (i.e., Bob) without being overheard by other
legitimate receivers. Thus, Alice can adapt its transmission
rate accordingly in order to achieve perfect secrecy. In such a
scenario, the average secrecy capacity is an insightful metric
once it quantifies the average secrecy rate [7].
Proposition 1: The achievable rates of the DF protocol
for the relay-eavesdropper channel in the presence of self-
interference is Rs “ rlog2 p1` ΓFDq ´ log2 p1` ΓEqs` ,
where rxs` fi max tx, 0u.
Proof: Based on the average rate derivation for traditional
relaying in [17], plus given the cooperative secrecy rates from
[1], and given that all RVs are independent we attain
Rs “ rRFD ´REs` ,
“ rlog2 p1`min tΓR , ΓBuq ´ log2 p1` ΓEqs` .
(4)
3Let us introduce a new RV defined as ΓFD “ min tΓR , ΓBu,
whose CDF is introduced in Appendix A, then plugging it into
(4) we conclude the proof.
Theorem 1: Assuming the non-negativity of the secrecy rate
and the independence of RVs, the average secrecy rate is
Rs “
ż 8
0
ż 8
0
Rs fΓFDpγFDq fΓEpγEqdγFD dγE,
“ 1
ln 2
ż 8
0
FΓEpγEq
1` γE r1´ FΓFDpγEqs dγE.
(5)
Proof: See [18].
Next, since the CDFs of ΓFD and ΓE are known and
with help of Theorem 1 we attain the average secrecy rate
(bits/s/Hz) as
Rs “ 1
ln 2
ż 8
0
erfc pηEq erfc pηBq erfc pηRq
8p1` zq dz , (6)
where ηE “ µE´lnpzq?
2 σE
, ηB “ ´µB`lnpzq?
2σE
and ηR “ ´µR`lnpzq?
2 σR
.
Nevertheless, (6) does not have a closed form solution, there-
fore we resort to Gauss-Laguerre quadrature [11, Ch. 25.4].
Theorem 2: Under the assumption of perfect CSI and com-
posite fading, the average secrecy rate in bits/s/Hz is
Rs » 1
ln 2
Kÿ
k“1
ωLk e
χLk
8
erfc
`
η1E
˘
erfc
`
η1B
˘
erfc
`
η1B
˘
, (7)
where η1i with i P tB ,E ,Ru is written as in ηi but replacing z
by eχLk ´ 1, and K is the order of the Laguerre polynomial.
Proof: Please see [18] and notice that we resort to
Gauss-Laguerre quadrature [11, Ch. 25.4] to attain (7), thus
χLk are the roots of the Laguerre polynomial while ωLk “
χLk {
`pK ` 1q LK`1pχLkq˘2 are the weights of the Gauss-
Laguerre quadrature [11, Ch. 25.4]. The error can be ana-
lytically estimated as indicated in [11, Ch. 25.4].
IV. SCENARIO 2 (SC2): SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
Now let us suppose that Alice has no knowledge of Eve’s
CSI except for channel statistics. Thus, in order to protect
its transmission from a possible inimical attack, Alice com-
municates with Bob with a constant secrecy rate Rs ą 0,
which yields a certain secrecy outage probability3. Note that
Alice assumes that Eve’ secrecy rate is RE “ RFD ´ Rs,
thus security is compromised as soon as CE ą RE. Otherwise,
perfect secrecy is assured. Then, secrecy outage probability
is the appropriated metric to evaluate the performance of a
quasi-static fading wiretap channel when the transmitter has
no CSI and the receivers have CSI of their own channels
only [7]. Next, we determine the secrecy outage probability as
OP “ Pr rRs ă Rss. Thus, an outage event occurs whenever
the instantaneous secrecy rate Rs falls below the target secrecy
rate Rs fixed by Alice.
Theorem 3: Assuming the non-negativity of the secrecy rate
and that only CSI of the legitimate channel is available at the
3In order to avoid confusion it is noteworthy that the secrecy capacity is
denoted by the calligraphic letter C and the secrecy achievable rate by letter
R, while the attempted transmission rate is represented by the letter R.
transmitter, we can define the secrecy outage probability in
bits/s/Hz as
OP » 1´
Kÿ
k“1
ωHk erfc
´
´µB`lnpυEq?
2σB
¯
erfc
´
´µR`lnpυEq?
2 σR
¯
4
?
pi
, (8)
where υE “ 2Rs
`
exp
`
µE `
?
2σE χ
H
k
˘` 1˘´ 1.
Proof: Based on [1], [7], we can define the secrecy outage
probability under composite fading channels as
OP “ Pr rRsăRss“Pr rlog2 p1`γFDq´ log2 p1`γEqăRss
“
8ż
0
FΓFDp2Rsp1 ` zq ´ 1qfEpzqdz. (9)
Note that the CDF of ΓFD is given in Appendix A. However,
(9) does not have a closed-from solution. Therefore, we resort
to semi-analytical solution based on Gauss-Hermite quadrature
[11, Ch. 25.4]. The weights of the Hermite polynomial are
given as ωHk “
?
pi 2K´1K! { `K2 HK´1pχHk q˘, where χHk
are its roots of order K [11, Ch. 25.4].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
Alice, the relay and Bob are assumed to be on a straight line,
the relay is at the center and the distance between Alice and
Bob is 30m, unless stated otherwise. Additionally, we assume
a path loss exponent of ν “ 4 as well as unitary bandwidth. We
assume that all channels experience some LOS, and therefore
undergo fading with m “ 2, while the shadowing standard
deviation is σ “ 10dB4. We consider equal power allocation
thus total power is given as PA “ PR “ P .
Fig. 2 depicts the average secrecy rate (Sc1) as a function
of transmit power P in dBm for different values of self-
interference cancellation for NE P t2, 4, 8u antennas. Eve’s
average SNR is set to µE “ .21 and σE “ .76, which
means that µΩp “ ´10 dB and σΩp “ 5 dB so that Eve
is closer to Alice and the relay than Bob. Notice that the
more sophisticated is the self-interference cancellation (lower
values of δ), higher is the achievable average secrecy rate.
For instance, at high SNR, the average secrecy rate can be
doubled with the reduction of the self-interference from -80dB
to -90dB. Even though sophisticated interference mitigation
schemes have been recently proposed, such cancellation levels
– in the order of -90dB – are still a challenging task to
achieve [4]. The average secrecy rate degrades as the num-
ber of antennas grows. Nevertheless, it is still possible to
communicate with perfect secrecy. Notice that in terms of
secrecy capacity the impact of relatively poor self-interference
cancellation (δ ą ´75 dB) is much worse than that of having
a sophisticated eavesdropper (with several receive antennas
applying maximum ratio combining).
Further, Fig. 3 shows the secrecy outage probability (Sc2)
as a function of the transmit power for Rs P t2, 4u bits/s/Hz.
Secrecy outage probability considerably increases with bet-
ter self-interference attenuation and cancellation at the relay
4We assume that the polynomial order of K “ 24 since it presents great
accuracy. We recall that the error can be analytically estimated which is
another advantage of such quadrature methods [11].
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Fig. 2. Average secrecy rate Rs as a function of the transmit power P in
dBm for different values of self-interference cancellation (δ) and number of
antennas NE.
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Fig. 3. Outage probability, Pr rRs ă Rss, as a function of the transmit
power P in dBm with different values of self-interference cancellation (δ) as
well as target secrecy rate Rs.
(lower δ). Notice also that as the target secrecy rate increases,
the secrecy outage probability decreases since Alice imposes
a more stringent secure rate requirement.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We investigated the secrecy performance of FD relaying
in the presence of a multiple antenna eavesdropper under
composite fading. Two scenarios are considered based on the
CSI availability at the transmitters: a) full CSI is available
from both intended and unintended receivers; b) only the
legitimate channels are known to Alice. Our results show
that the self-interference at the relay considerably affects
performance regardless of the scenario. However, even under
strong self-interference and in the presence of a sophisticated
multiple antenna eavesdropper, FD relaying is feasible.
APPENDIX
Let ΓR and ΓB be independent and LN distributed, thus
CDF of ΓFD “ min tΓR , ΓBu can be readily attained through
standard statistical methods [16], such that the CDF is
FΓFDpzq “ 1´
1
4
erfc
´
´µR`lnpzq?
2σR
¯
erfc
´
´µB`lnpzq?
2σB
¯
. (10)
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